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1

Respondents Beaver Creek Coal Company and CIGNA
Insurance Company (hereinafter collectively referred to as
"Beaver Creek11) hereby file their Brief in response to
Petitioner's Petition For Review on appeal to this Court from the
Industrial Commission,

The Industrial Commission denied

Petitioner's motion for review of the administrative law judge's
order denying Petitioner's claim for workers' compensation
benefits.
JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over the Petition for
Review pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §§ 35-1-82.53(2)(1988),
35-1-86(1988), 63-46b-16(1988), and 78-2a-3(2) (a) (1988), and Rule
14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Beaver Creek submits that the issues on appeal and the
applicable standards of appellate review are as follows:
(1)

Whether Petitioner's 1983 industrial accident is

the medical cause of his disability.'
The proper standard of review of this issue is the
"substantial evidence" test because medical causation is a
'Though the Commission found that Petitioner did not prove
medical or legal causation, the critical issue in this case is
whether Petitioner's disability is the medical result of the 1983
industrial accident*
1

factual issue.

Grace Drilling Co, v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d

63, 68 (Utah App. 1989).

The Industrial Commission (the

"Commission") found that Petitioner failed to show that his
disability was legally and medically caused by the 1983 accident,
(R. 114). Petitioner claims that this Court should apply a
"correction of error" standard, but this Court has held that
whether a disability is medically the result of a work related
activity is a question of fact.

Merriam v. Board of Review, 812

P.2d 447, 450 (Utah App. 1991).

The proper standard of review

for questions of fact is the "substantial evidence" test.
Johnson v. Board of Review. 198 Utah Adv. Rep. 67, 68 (Utah App.
1992).

Findings of fact are affirmed if they are "supported by

substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record
before the court."

IsJ., citing Stewart v. Board of Review. 831

P.2d 134, 137 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting Utah Code Annotated § 6346(b)-16(4)(g) (1989)).

Petitioner does not explain why this

issue could be considered a question of law and his argument for
a correction of error standard is completely without support.
(2)

Whether Utah Code Annotated § 35-1-99 (1981) is an

unconstitutional statute of repose.
The standard of appellate review of this issue is
correction of error because the Commission lacks authority to
address the constitutionality of the statute.
2

Avis v. Board of

Review. 194 Utah Adv. Rep. 57, 58 (Utah App. 1992).

Petitioner

argues on p. 1 of his brief that the issue is "whether the
Industrial Commission committed error in finding that the
Petitioner had failed to satisfy certain statute of limitations."
This is not a correct statement of the issue because Petitioner
argues that § 35-1-99 is unconstitutional, not that the
Commission misapplied it.
(3)

Whether the Industrial Commission abused its

discretion in not referring this matter to a medical panel.
The standard of review of this issue is "abuse of
discretion."

The Supreme Court of Utah has stated that, in some

cases, failure to convene a medical panel is an "abuse of
discretion."

Champion Home Builders v. Industrial Commission.

703 P.2d 306, 308 (Utah 1985).

This Court also applied an abuse

of discretion standard when reviewing whether an ALJ should have
referred the medical causation issue to a medical panel.
Workers' Comp. Fund v. Industrial Commission. 761 P.2d 572, 577
(Utah App. 1988) .
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES. RULES AND REGULATIONS
The following statutes and rule are determinative in
this appeal:
Utah Code Annotated S 63-46b-16(4)(g) (1988), § 35-1-77
(1982) and S 35-1-99 (1981) and Utah Administrative Code R490-13

9.

The determinative statutes and rule are set forth in full in

Exhibit A.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Petitioner seeks review of the Commission's Order
denying the Motion for Review of the ALJ's Order denying workers'
compensation benefits.

The Commission denied the Motion for

Review because Petitioner did not prove that the 1983 industrial
accident was the legal and medical cause of his disability.
(R. 114).
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below
On September 26, 1988, Petitioner filed a claim for
benefits for injuries which allegedly occurred at work at Beaver
Creek Coal Co. on March 6, 1987.

(R. 51-52).

That claim was

dismissed and Petitioner filed another claim on May 22, 1990
alleging injuries for a work accident which occurred sometime in
1983.

(R. 111). Beaver Creek submits that Petitioner's

disability was not caused by the 1983 industrial accident, but is
due solely to Petitioner's degenerative spine condition.
A hearing before an ALJ was held on December 4, 1990.
(R. 51). Petitioner's attorney stated at the hearing that
Petitioner was not involved in a 1987 industrial accident.
52).

(R.

The ALJ found, among other things, that Petitioner may have
4

been involved in an industrial accident in 1983 or 1984 but that
the accident did not cause the disability for which Petitioner
seeks relief.

(R. 65). The ALJ dismissed Petitioner's claim

with prejudice and Petitioner filed a Motion for Review with the
Commission.

The Commission upheld the ALJ's Order but

substituted its findings of fact and conclusions of law for those
of the ALJ.

(R. 113). On August 10, 1992, the Commission denied

Petitioner's Motion for Review, finding that Petitioner failed to
show by a preponderance of the evidence that his disability was
legally and medically caused by the industrial accident.
(R. 114). The Commission also found that Petitioner's claims for
temporary total, temporary partial, permanent partial and related
compensation arising from the 1983 accident are barred by the
statute of limitations in U.C.A. S 35-1-99.

(R. 114).

Statement of Facts
Petitioner has been diagnosed with a severe progressive
spine disease.

(R. 145). Petitioner seeks workers' compensation

benefits for his disability claiming that it was caused by a 1983
industrial accident.

(R. Ill). The exact date of the industrial

accident is unknown, but it apparently occurred sometime in 1983
when Petitioner was on a tractor watering a roadway and was
pulled under a belt line.

(R. 53). After the accident

Petitioner walked 3/5 of a mile out of the mine and did not
5

require or receive medical attention.

(R. 64). Petitioner

testified that he completed some sort of accident report form
after the 1983 accident, but no such report form has been
located.

(R. 53). There is no evidence that Petitioner or his

employer completed an Employers First Report of Injury form.

The

Commission found that the form which Petitioner completed was an
MSHA form.

(R. 117).

Petitioner continued to work for four years after the
accident, but claimed at the hearing that he began experiencing
pain within six months after the accident.

(R. 54). Petitioner

did not see a doctor until over three years after the accident.
He testified that he treated the pain with Anacin.

(R. 54, 111).

Petitioner took no time off of work because of the industrial
accident and did not mention the industrial accident to his
family physician.

(R. 56, 111).

Before he filed a claim on May 22, 1990 for the 1983
industrial accident, Petitioner filed a claim seeking benefits
for an alleged 1987 accident.

(R. Ill). Petitioner did not

produce an Employers First Report of Injury Form for a 1987
accident and his attorney has now conceded that there was no 1987
accident.

(R. 60). At the hearing before the ALJ Petitioner

said that any reference by Dr. Kirkpatrick to a March, 1987

6

industrial incident was incorrect.

(R. 55). The 1983 industrial

accident is the subject of this appeal.
After working for over three years after the 1983
industrial accident, Petitioner went to see a Dr. Jackson and
Dr. Jackson referred Petitioner to Dr. Kirkpatrick.

(R. 206).

Dr. Kirkpatrick first saw Petitioner on March 11, 1987 and in a
letter to Dr. Jackson on that day Dr. Kirkpatrick stated that
Petitioner's x-rays show "severe spondylosis and disc disease,
especially at C6-7."

(R. 215). Petitioner's medical records

reveal that he continued to see Dr. Kirkpatrick until August of
1989.

(R. 142). Petitioner's medical records also indicate that

Petitioner's condition continued to deteriorate after his first
visit to Dr. Kirkpatrick.

Dr. Kirkpatrick stated in his

April 28, 1989 records that Petitioner had "progressively severe
spondylosis everywhere and as fast as we try to fix one area,
another area crops up and becomes a problem."

(R. 145).

Dr. Kirkpatrick also stated on that day "I consider the patient
medically, completely disabled because of his progressive
spondyliotic disease involving all parts of spine."

(R. 145).

Petitioner saw Dr. Kirkpatrick several times between
his first visit on March 11, 1987 and his last recorded visit on
August 18, 1989.

Dr. Kirkpatrick performed surgeries on

Petitioner's neck and back, but Petitioner's condition only
7

improved temporarily.

On January 30, 1989 Dr. Kirkpatrick's

impression of Petitioner was "C4-5 disc disease and spondylosis,
gradually progressive and worse but without radiculopothy at this
time" and "chronic L5-S1 severe disc disease and spondylosis with
grade I spondylolisthesis . . .••

(R. 148). On April 28, 1989

Dr. Kirkpatrick's impression of Petitioner was "cervical,
thoracic and lumbar spondylosis, progressively severe."
(R. 145). Finally, on August 18, 1989, Petitionees last
recorded visit to Dr. Kirkpatrick, the doctor's impression was
"progressive diffuse spondylosis of cervical, thoracic and lumbar
spine, currently most symptomatic in the cervical area."
(R. 143). On that day Dr. Kirkpatrick also stated:

"I don't

think surgery is going to be the answer for him and I think the
best thing we can do now is have him see a rheumatology
specialist . . . "

(R. 143).

Dr. Kirkpatrick's medical records do not say that
Petitioner's condition was caused by the 1983 industrial
accident.

The only evidence directly connecting Petitioner's

disability to anv alleged industrial accident is a letter from
Dr. Kirkpatrick's to Petitioner's attorney and a summary of
Medical Record form.

(R. 149, 217). Both of the above documents

link Petitioner's injury to a 1987 accident not the 1983
accident.

Dr. Kirkpatrick's records do refer to a 1987 accident;
8

they say that Petitioner injured his neck when he bumped into a
screen in 1987,

(R. 194).

Dr. Kirkpatrick's records also indicate that Petitioner
had neck pain dating back twelve years.

(R. 194). Petitioner

was asked about this twelve year old neck pain at the hearing
before the ALJ.

At first Petitioner said he could not explain

the doctor's reference to the old neck pain and then he denied
that he ever mentioned a twelve year old neck pain to Dr.
Kirkpatrick.

(R. 54).

In an order dated August 10, 1992 the Commission
substituted its finding of fact and conclusions of law for those
of the ALJ and found that Petitioner did not prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the 1983 industrial accident
caused his disability.

(R. 114). The Commission found that

there was an accident in 1983 but that Petitioner sustained only
minor injuries and that the accident did not cause Petitioner's
disability.

(R. 114). The Commission concluded that there was

no 1987 industrial accident (R. 113). Finally, the Commission
found that Petitioner failed to timely file claims for temporary
total, temporary partial, and permanent partial disability
compensation and therefore they were barred by the statute of
limitations imposed by section 35-1-99 (1981).

9

(R. 114).

The Commission supported its conclusion that Petitioner
did not prove medical causation by highlighting specific facts in
the record.

The Commission emphasized Dr. Kirkpatrick's

impression that Petitioner had spondylosis.

(R. 112). Also, the

Commission noted Dr. Kirkpatrick's July 1, 1988 medical records
which stated that Petitioner's lumbar spine x-rays "showed a
significant grade 7 L5-S1 spondylolisthesis with associated
severe disc disease and spondylosis.1'

(R. 112). The Commission

also emphasized Dr. Kirkpatrick's October 19, 1988 medical
records which say that Petitioner's past history was
••noncontributory to his condition, except for a long life of hard
labor, which contributed to both upper and lower spinal disease."
(R. 112). Finally, the Commission discounted Dr. Kirkpatrick's
statement that Petitioner's condition is at least partially
related to the March 6, 1987 industrial accident because
Petitioner's attorney stated that there was no 1987 industrial
accident.

(R. 113).
After considering the above facts, the Commission found

that there was insufficient evidence to conclude that
Petitioner's disability was medically caused or aggravated by the
industrial accident.

(R 113). The Commission also stated that

there was no basis on which to refer the case to a medical panel
because they "have been shown no conflicting medical reports, and
10

the applicant has failed to carry his burden of persuasion.11

(R.

113) .
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Petitioner seeks permanent total disability benefits
for a degenerative condition in his spine which he alleges was
caused by a 1983 industrial accident, despite the fact that he
did not seek any medical attention for the alleged injury until
over three years after the accident and returned to work
immediately following the accident.

(R. 34, 111). Petitioner's

disability is caused by a progressive spine condition and not by
the 1983 industrial accident.

Petitioner has provided no medical

evidence linking the 1983 industrial accident to his disability,
let alone proving that it caused his disability.

The Commission

found that Petitioner did not prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the 1983 accident was the medical or legal cause of
his disability.

The Commission made the factual finding of no

medical causation based on the facts in the record.

The proper

standard of review of that finding is whether it is supported by
substantial evidence, which it clearly is.
In this case. Petitioner has not marshaled the evidence
supporting the findings of the Commission nor has he shown that
there is not substantial evidence supporting the Commission's
finding.

In order to have a factual finding overturned on
11

appeal, Petitioner must marshal the evidence and show that the
Commission's findings are not supported by substantial evidence.
Because Petitioner did not do this, this Court must defer to the
unchallenged factual findings of the Commission.
The Commission also found that some of Petitioner's
claims are barred by Utah Code Annotated § 35-1-99.

Petitioner

argues that S 35-1-99 is an unconstitutional statute of repose.
This Court, however, recently found that § 35-1-99 is not a
statute of repose but a constitutional statute of limitation.
The Court should not reach the statute of limitations issue,
however, because the failure to prove medical causation is
dispositive of all the issues in this case.
Finally, Petitioner argues that the Commission abused
its discretion by not referring this matter to a medical panel,
but there was absolutely no reason to refer this case to a
medical panel because there was no evidence of medical causation.
Petitioner's medical records indicate that he has a severe
degenerative spine condition but Petitioner provides no evidence
to link his condition to the 1983 accident.

In addition,

Petitioner worked for over three years following the industrial
accident and neither the Petitioner nor his doctors have
explained how the accident caused symptoms which did not occur
until some three and a half years after the accident.
12

Finally,

referral to a medical panel is not mandatory, but is in the
discretion of the Commission.
ARGUMENT
!•

THE PETITION FOR REVIEW SHOULD BE DENIED BECAUSE
PETITIONER DID NOT PROVE THAT THE 1983 INDUSTRIAL
ACCIDENT CAUSED HIS DISABILITY AND BECAUSE HE FAILED TO
MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE ON APPEAL TO THIS COURT.
A.

Petitioner Has Provided No Evidence That The 198 3
Accident is the Medical Cause of His Disability.

In order to receive workers' compensation benefits,
Petitioner must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his
disability was caused by an industrial accident.

Large v.

Industrial Commission. 758 P.2d 954, 956 (Utah App. 1988).

"The

medical causation requirement will prevent an employer from
becoming a general insurer of his employees and discourage
fraudulent claims.*1

Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P. 2d 15,

27 (Utah App. 1986).
In this case, Petitioner has failed to meet his burden
of proof.2

(R. 114). The Commission found that Petitioner's

Petitioner argues that workers' compensation laws should be
liberally construed. Liberal construction does not, however,
relieve Petitioner from the requirement of proving all elements
of his claim by a preponderance of the evidence, including medical causation. In Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Industrial Commission.
709 P.2d 1168, 1169 (Utah 1985), the Supreme Court of Utah stated
11
[wjhile disability claims are liberally construed in favor of
awarding benefits . . . we do not overturn the Commission's
findings unless they are arbitrary or capricious, wholly without
cause, contrary to the one inevitable conclusion from the
evidence or without substantial evidence to support them."
13

back condition was not caused by the 1983 industrial accident.
(R. 114). Indeed, Petitioner's medical records indicate that his
disability is due to disc disease, progressive spondylosis and
spondylolisthesis.

(R. 148). Dr. Kirkpatrick stated in his

records "I consider the patient medically completely disabled
because of his progressive spondylitic disease involving all
parts of his spine.w

(R. 145).

(Emphasis added.)

The lack of a

connection between his problem and the accident is shown by the
fact that the accident occurred in 1983 yet Petitioner did not
see a doctor until late in 1986.

Also, Petitioner returned to

work following the accident and continued working for 3 1/2 years
until his degenerative condition became unbearable.

(R. 54).

Petitioner presented no evidence to connect his degenerative
spine condition with the 1983 industrial accident.
On page 11 of his brief Petitioner argues that Beaver
Creek and the other Respondents did not provide medical evidence
suggesting that Petitioner's condition was not related to the
1983 accident.

It is Petitioner's burden to prove causation, not

Respondents' burden to disprove causation.

Petitioner provided

no evidence of causation for Beaver Creek to refute.

The only

evidence Petitioner refers to in his brief is in a letter from
Dr. Kirkpatrick to Petitioner's attorney (Petitioner's Brief at
p. 11), but the doctor's letter refers to a 1987 accident, which
14

Petitionees attorney says did not occur.

(R. 149) .

Dr. Kirkpatrick's February 27, 1989 letter states "I would
estimate that his disability is at least partially related to his
industrial injury of March 6, 1987, although some of the symptoms
and problems certainly predated this event."
(Emphasis added.)

(R. 149).

There is no reference to the 1983 accident.

On Page 18 of his Brief, Petitioner argues that causation is in
dispute because his medical records "add some confusion to the
issue because of Dr. Kirkpatrick's referral to a nonexistent 1987
industrial accident rather than the one in 1983." Dr.
Kirkpatrick's reference to a 1987 accident, however, is in
response to Petitioner's attorney's February 16, 1989 letter
requesting that Dr. Kirkpatrick comment on whether Petitioner's
disability was "significantly related to his industrial injury of
March 6, 1987." (R. 225) (emphasis added).

Petitioner provides

no medical evidence of a connection between his condition and the
1983 accident.
Dr. Kirkpatrick's records do mention a

,,

1982M

industrial incident but do not say that the "1982" incident was
the cause of Petitioner's disability.

Instead, in an April 28,

1989 letter to Dr. Max Morgan, Dr. Kirkpatrick states that he
treated Petitioner "because of progressively severe cervical and

15

lumbar spondylosis causing neck pain, back pain and disfunction
of all four limbs."
B.

(R. 144).

Petitioner Did Not Marshal The Evidence In Favor
Of The Commissions Finding.

In order to overturn the factual findings of the
Commission, Petitioner must first marshal the evidence supporting
the Commission's finding and then show that the finding is not
supported by substantial evidence.
68.

Grace Drilling, 776 P.2d at

In Grace Drilling, this Court explained the application of

the substantial evidence test for reviewing findings of fact:
[i]t is also important to note that the
whole record test' necessarily requires that
a party challenging the Board's findings of
fact must marshal[] all of the evidence
supporting the findings and show that despite
the supporting facts, and in light of the
conflicting contradictory evidence, the
findings are not supported by substantial
evidence. Id.
9

This Court also stated in Grace Drilling that:

,f

[i]n undertaking

such a review, this Court will not substitute its judgment as
between two reasonable conflicting views, even though we may have
come to a different conclusion had the case come before us for de
novo review.*1

Id., and:

"[i)t is the province of the Board not

appellate courts, to resolve conflicting evidence, and where
inconsistent inferences can be drawn from the same evidence, it
is for the Board to draw the inferences."

Id., citing Board of

Educ. of Montgomery County v. Pavnter, 303 Md. 22, 491 A.2d 1186,
16

1193 (1985).

Finally, in Intermountain Health Care v. Board of

Review, 839 P.2d 841, 844 (Utah App. 1992), this Court held that,
in order to marshal the evidence, one must "amass the evidence
supporting the ALJ's findings."

Petitioner does not satisfy his

obligation of marshaling the evidence simply by arguing his own
position with no regard for the evidence supporting the findings
of the Commission,

id.

When a petitioner only argues his own

position and does not marshal the evidence, this Court has held
that it will not disturb the findings of the ALJ and the
Commission.

Id.

In this case, Petitioner did not even attempt to
marshal the evidence in favor of the Commission's findings, nor
does he explain his theory as to how he has proven that the 1983
accident caused Petitioner's spondylosis and spondylolisthesis.
Petitioner merely argues that "there was no medical evidence
offered at the hearing which suggests that Mr. Denny's injuries
were not at least partially the result of the industrial
accident."

Not only is this inaccurate, it does not amount to

marshaling the evidence.
Petitioner's excuse for not marshaling the evidence is
an unfounded argument that the ALJ's findings of fact were
inadequate and, therefore, he was denied the ability to marshal
the evidence.

In this case, it is the Commission's findings of
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fact which are on review and the Commission's findings are
adequate and clearly meet the standards set out in the recent
case of Adams v. Board of Review, 821 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1991).
The Commission stated in its Order, "based on the concession of
the respondents and our analysis of the evidence which flowed
therefrom, we will substitute our findings and conclusions of law
for those of the ALJ."

(R. 113). The Commission can choose to

use its own findings of fact and conclusions of law or it can use
the ALJ's.

Giles v. Industrial Commission, 692 P.2d 743, 745

(Utah 1984) .
Adams requires findings which "indicate respectively
(1) the issues decided, . . . (2) the legal interpretation and
application made . . . and (3) the subsidiary factual findings in
support of the decision . . ."

Ifl. at 6.

In this case, (1) the

Commission addressed the question "whether there was shown to be
medical causation" (R, 111) and found that Petitioner did not
prove that his 1983 accident was the medical cause of his
disability.

(R. 114).

(2) The Commission applied the law that

compensation will be awarded only when the industrial accident is
the medical and legal cause of the disability for which
compensation is sought.

(3) The Commission supported its

decision by pointing to specific "subsidiary" facts regarding
Petitioner's medical history.

The Commission stated in its Order
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that Dr. Kirkpatrick's records show "a significant grade one L5Sl spondylolisthesis with associated severe disc disease and
spondylosis.11

(R. 112). The Commission also focused on Dr.

Kirkpatrick's October 19, 1988 statement that Petitioner's past
history was Hnoncontributory to his condition, except for long
life of hard labor, which has contributed to both upper and lower
spinal disease."

(R. 112). Most importantly, the Commission

pointed to the lack of medical evidence of causation between the
1983 accident and Petitioner's condition.

Petitioner stated and

the Commission found that there was no industrial accident in
1987 and, therefore, the Commission discounted the only causation
evidence provided by Petitioner, Dr. Kirkpatrick's statement
about the disability being partially due to a 1987 industrial
accident.

(R. 113).
The Commission made adequate factual findings to

support its conclusion of no medical causation and Petitioner
failed to marshal the evidence in favor of that conclusion.
Therefore, this Court should not disturb the Commission's
findings.3

^Petitioner argues on page 12 of his brief that the
Commission's findings are inadequate and attempts to support his
argument by claiming that the employer and the insurance carrier
agreed that "The Decision and Order are not truly supported by
adequate findings based on the entire record." (R. at 90). This
statement referred to the AU's Order and not to the final Order
of the Commission. As stated above, the Commission substituted
its findings and conclusion for those of the ALJ.
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II.

PETITIONERS CLAIMS FOR TEMPORARY TOTAL, TEMPORARY
PARTIAL AND PERMANENT PARTIAL BENEFITS ARE BARRED BY
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN U,C,A, S 3 5-1-99,
A.

This Court Should Not Reach The Statute of
Limitation Issue Because The Petition Can be
Dismissed Solely on the Lack of Proof of Medical
Causation.

As discussed above, Petitioner has failed to meet his
burden of proving that the 1983 industrial accident caused his
disability and has failed to marshal the evidence in favor of the
Commission's findings.

Therefore, if this Court finds that the

Commission's decision is supported by substantial evidence or
that Petitioner failed to marshal the evidence, there is no
reason to reach the statute of limitations issue because the
finding of no medical causation is dispositive as to all of
Petitioner's claims.
B.

U.C.A. < 35-1-99 is Not an Unconstitutional
gtatVte Pf Rqpose.

Petitioner failed to file a claim for compensation
within the statute of limitations of U.C.A. § 35-1-99 (1981)
which provides in part, "(ijf no claim for compensation is filed
with the Industrial Commission within three years from the date
of the accident or the date of the last payment of compensation,
the right to compensation shall be wholly barred. . . . M
Petitioner does not deny that he did not file a claim within the
time allowed in S 35-1-99 (1981).
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Rather, Petitioner argues that

§ 35-1-99 (1981) is an unconstitutional statute of repose which
violates the open courts provision of the Utah Constitution.

In

Avis v. Board of Review, 194 Utah Adv. Rep. 57 (Utah App. 1992),
however, this Court held that Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-99 (1974) is
a statute of limitations and not an unconstitutional statute of
repose.

The relevant portion of § 3 5-1-99 did not change between

1974 and 1981. At all relevant times § 35-1-99 read in part,
" [i]f no claim for compensation is filed with the industrial
commission within three years from the date of the accident . . .
the right of compensation shall be wholly barred."

This Court

found that S 35-1-99 (1974) is a statute of limitations "because
it runs from the date of injury, when the cause of action
accrues, not from a point in time unrelated to when the cause of
action arose."

JjJ* at 58. A statute of repose,

on the other

hand, " . . . prevents a suit a statutorily specified number of
years after a particular event occurs, without regard to when the
cause of action accrues."

Is}., quoting, Velarde v. Board of

Review, 831 P.2d 123, 125 (Utah App. 1992).

In Avis, this Court

also stated that the petitioner cited no cases in which a statute
of limitations was held to violate the open courts provision.

Id.
Despite the fact that this Court found that § 35-1-99
was not a statute of repose, it applied the open courts
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constitutional analysis to the petitioner's claim.

Id. at 58.

The petitioner in Avis was injured on the job in 1968 and was
treated for recurring back pain from 1968 to 1982.

Id. at 57.

In 1988, the Petitioner was given a permanent partial impairment
rating due to his injury.

I<i. On December 4, 1990, the

Petitioner filed a claim seeking permanent partial disability
benefits, but the ALJ ruled that the petitioner's claim was
barred by S 35-1-99 (1974).

The petitioner argued that § 35-1-99

was an unconstitutional statute of repose because it precluded
him from filing a claim before he received a rating and before he
knew that he was permanently partially impaired.

Id. at 58.

However, this Court held that, though courts have recognized
exceptions to alleviate the harshness of statutes of limitation,
those cases usually involve situations in which a petitioner had
no way of knowing of the injury.

Is|. at 59.

Because the

petitioner in Avis knew of his injury within the limitation
period, the open courts provision was not violated.
same is true in this case.

Id.

The

Petitioner claims that he had pain

six months after his industrial accident and therefore, if this
is true. Petitioner knew that he may have been injured and had
notice of a potential claim.
Avis clearly held that S 35-1-99 is not an
unconstitutional statute of repose.
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It controls in this case.

Therefore, because Petitioner did not file within the time
provided for in § 35-1-99, his claims for temporary total,
temporary partial, and permanent partial benefits are clearly
barred.
III.

THE COMMISSION DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN NOT
REFERRING THIS MATTER TO A MEDICAL PANEL BECAUSE THERE
WAS NO EVIDENCE OF CAUSATION TO WARRANT REFERRAL.
A.

Referral to a Medical Panel Was Unnecessary
Because Petitioner Did Not Provide Evidence to
Put Causation in Issue.

In this case, Petitioner did not meet his burden of
proof; he provided absolutely no evidence that the 1983
industrial accident caused or contributed to his current
disability.

Failure to refer to a medical panel cannot be an

abuse of discretion when there is no evidence of causation.
Petitioner has the burden of proving causation and is not
entitled to have his case referred to a medical panel in order to
attempt to create a causation issue.

If there is a causation

issue, then the Commission may refer to a medical panel to assist
in resolving that issue, but when causation is not at issue,
there is no reason to expend state resources to convene a medical
panel.

In Workers' Comp. Fund v. Industrial Commission, 761 P.2d

572, 577 (Utah App. 1988), this Court stated in response to an
argument that failure to refer to a medical panel was an abuse of
discretion, "we cannot say that the administrative law judge
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abused his discretion in not referring this case to a medical
panel when there was medical evidence to support his finding of
medical causation.11

It follows that there is also no requirement

to refer to a medical panel when there is no evidence of
causation.
In this case, there is no evidence of causation and,
conversely, there is ample evidence that Petitioner's condition
was caused by a degenerative spine disease.

Dr. Kirkpatrick's

April 28, 1989 letter to Dr. Max Morgan states, ,fI consider the
patient medically completely disabled because of his progressive
spondylitic disease involving all parts of his spine."

(R. 145)

(emphasis added).
B.

Utah Administrative Code Section R490-1-9 Does Not
to Petitioner's Case Because There Are No
M
Significant Medical Issues" Involved.

APPIV

Petitioner argues that R490-1-9 of the Utah
Administrative Code mandates reference to a medical panel in this
case.

Even if R490-1-9 were mandatory, which it is not, it does

not apply to Petitioner's case because there is not a
"significant medical issue" in the case.

Petitioner argues that

there is a significant medical issue because medical causation is
the primary issue in this case.

There is no doubt that medical

causation is the primary issue, but Petitioner has clearly failed
to prove medical causation because there is no medical evidence
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to support his contention.

R490-1-9 says that significant

medical issues "generally" must be shown by conflicting medical
reports.

There are no conflicting reports in this case.

There

is no evidence of causation, therefore, even if R490-1-9 did
mandate referral to a panel in some cases, it certainly does not
do so in this case since there is no "significant medical issue."
C.

Referral to a Medical Panel is Discretionary.

Reference to a medical panel is discretionary.

Utah

Code Ann. S 35-1-77(1)(a) (1982) states:
Upon the filing of a claim for compensation
for injury by accident, or for death, arising
out of and in the course of employment, and
if the employer or its insurance carrier
denies liability, the commission may refer
the medical aspects of the case to a medical
panel appointed by the commission. (Emphasis
added.)
The above statute makes referral to a medical panel
discretionary; the Commission may appoint a medical panel but is
not required to do so.

In Hone v. J.F. Shea Company, 728 P.2d

1008, 1012 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court stated:
"Reference to the medical panel is controlled by statute.

In

1982, the Legislature amended U.C.A. 5 35-1-77 (1953) and changed
the requirement of mandatory referral to a medical panel to
permissive referral."

Id.

Despite the above statute and case lav, Petitioner
argues that R490-1-9 mandates referral to a medical panel.
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R490-1-9, however, simply sets out guidelines and cannot be
construed as mandatory for a number of reasons.

The first reason

that R490-1-9 cannot be construed as mandatory is that the
Legislature intended referral to a medical panel to be
discretionary.

The Legislature specifically changed reference to

a medical panel from mandatory to discretionary.

Before it was

amended U.C.A. 35-1-77 (1953) read:
Upon the filing of a claim for compensation
for injury or by accident or for death
arising out of or in the course of employment
and where the employer or insurance carrier
denies liability, the Commission shall refer
the medical aspects of this case to a medical
panel appointed by the Commission. . . .
(Emphasis added.)
In 1982, the Legislature amended U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-77 and
changed the shall refer to a medical panel to may refer to a
medical panel.

Hone. 778 P.2d at 1012.

R490-1-9 should not be

read to circumvent legislative intent.
The second reason that the regulation cannot be
construed as mandatory is that, if it were mandatory, it would be
void as beyond the scope of U.C.A. S 35-1-77 (1988).

The word

"may* in S 35-1-77 indicates that it is discretionary and
therefore it cannot be made mandatory by a regulation.

In

Crpwther vf National M\it, Insi C P . , 762 p.2d 1119, 1122 (Utah
App. 1988), this Court stated:
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An administrative agency's authority to
promulgate regulations is limited to those
regulations which are consonant with the
statutory framework, and neither contrary to
the statute or beyond its scope.
Any regulation which makes referral to a medical panel mandatory
is not consistent with and goes beyond the scope of U.C.A.
§ 35-1-77 and is therefore void.
The final reason that R490-1-9 cannot be construed as
mandatory is that the ALJ can disregard the finding of the
medical panel in light of other evidence.

U.C.A. § 35-1-77(2)(d)

(1982) states:
The Commission may base its findings and
decisions on the report of the panel, medical
director, or medical consultants, but is not
bound by the report if other substantial
conflicting evidence in the case supports a
contrary finding.
In Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Wallace, 728 P.2d 1021, 1022 (Utah
1988), the Supreme Court of Utah found that the Commission can
reject the finding of the medical panel and rely on other
evidence in the record.

Also, in Pittsburgh Testing Laboratory

v. Keller. 657 P.2d 1367, 1371-1372 (Utah 1983), the Supreme
Court of Utah upheld the Commission's finding regarding medical
causation despite the fact that the medical panel made contrary
findings.

The Pittsburgh Testing court relied on other medical

evidence and rejected the medical panel report.

Id.

Where, as

here, the Commission determines that Petitioner has not met his
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burden of proof and there is no evidence of causation, it is
unnecessary to refer a case to a medical panel.

It would be

illogical to require the Commission to do so in light of the fact
that it could rely on other medical evidence and disregard the
findings of the medical panel.

It would also be a costly waste

of state resources to require reference of every matter to a
medical panel when the Commission determines that a petitioner
has not even provided enough evidence to put medical causation in
dispute.
Petitioner essentially argues for mandating referral to
a medical panel every time a petitioner cannot prove causation.
This is contrary to the 1982 amendment to U.C.A. § 35-1-77 and to
the spirit of the case lav, Champion Home Builders, 703 P.2d at
308, and should not be permitted.4

The Commission did not abuse

its discretion.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Beaver Creek respectfully
requests that this Court deny Petitioner's Petition for Review.
The August 10, 1992 Order of the Industrial Commission should be
affirmed because Petitioner did not prove by a preponderance of
*Though Petitioner argues for mandatory referral to a
medical panel, he also cites Champion Home Builders on p. 19 of
his brief- Champion Home Builders, however, clearly holds that
reference to a medical panel is in the discretion of the
Commission. 702 P.2d at 308.
28

the evidence that the 1983 industrial accident caused his
disability.
causation.

Indeed, Petitioner provided no evidence of
The Commission reviewed the medical records and made

a factual determination that there was no evidence of causation.
Petitioner did not marshal the evidence in support of that
determination and therefore the Order of the Industrial
Commissions should be affirmed.
DATED this 22*

day of January, 1993.
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

Steven J^/Aeschbacher
George S. Adondakis
Attorneys for Beaver Creek Coal Co.
and Cigna Insurance Co.
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Exhibit

63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative proceedings.
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or
the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review all
final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings.
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review
of agency action with the appropriate appellate
court in the form required by the appellate rules
of the appropriate appellate court
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern all additional filings
and proceedings in the appellate court.
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the
agency's record for judicial review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, except that:
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may
stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the
record;
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and copies for the record:
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to shorten, summarize, or
organize the record; or
(ii) according to any other provision of
law.
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on
the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a
person seeking judicial review has been substanUally
prejudiced by any of the following:

"A"

(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on
which the agency action is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied;
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues
requiring resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or
applied the law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process, or has failed
to follow prescribed procedure;
(f) the persons taking the agency action were
illegally constituted as a decision-making body
or were subject to disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by the agency,
that is not supported by substantial evidence
when viewed in light of the whole record before
the court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to
the agency by statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency'6 prior practice, unless the agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 1988

Exhibit

"A

35-1-77. Medical panel • Discretionary authority
of commission to refer case • Findings and report
• Objections to report • Hearing - Expenses.
Upon the filing of a claim for compensation for
injury by accident, or for death, arising out of or
in the course of employment, and where the
employer or insurance carrier denies liability, the
commission may refer the medical aspects of the
case to a medical panel appointed by the
commission and having the qualifications generally
applicable to the medical panel set forth in section
35-2-56. The medical panel shall then make such
study, take such X-rays and perform such tests,
including post-mortem examinations where
authorized by the commission, as it may determine
and thereafter make a report in writing to the
commission in a form prescribed by the
commission, and also make such additional
findings as the commission may require. The
commission shall promptly distribute full copies of
the report of the panel to the applicant, the
employer and the insurance carrier by registered
mail with return receipt requested. Within fifteen
days after such report is deposited in the United
States post office, the applicant, the employer or
the insurance carrier may fik with the commission
objections in writing thereto. If no objections are
to filed within such period, the report shall be
deemed admitted in evidence and the commission
may base its finding and decision on the report of
the panel, but shall not be bound by such Tcport if
there is other substantial conflicting evidence in
the case which supports a contrary finding by the
commission. If objections to such report are filed
the commission may set the case for hearing to
determine the facts and issues involved, and at
such hearing any party so desiring may request the
commission to have the chairman of the medical
Ptnd present at the bearing for examination and
cross-examination. For good cause shown the
commission may order other members of the
P*nd, with or without the chairman, to be present
*t the hearing for examination and crossexamination. Upon such bearing the written'report
°f the panel may be received as an exhibit but
shall not be considered as evidence in the case
except as far as it is sustained by the testimony
admitted. The expenses of such study and report
by the medical panel and of their appearance
before the commission shall be paid out of the
fund provided for by section 35-1-68.
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Exhibit

"A

35-1-99. Notice of Injury and daim for
compensation - limitation of action - Tolling
period for filing daim.
When an employee claiming to have suffered an
injury in the Service of his employer fails to give
notice to his employer of the time and place where
the accident and injury occurred, and of the
nature of the same, within 48 hours, when
possible, or fails to report for medical treatment
within said time! the compensation provided for
herein shall be reduced 13ft; provided, that
knowledge of such injury obtained from any
source on the pan of such employer, his managing
agent, superintendent, foreman or other person in
authority, or knowledge of any assertion by the
injured sufficient to afford an opportunity to the
employer to make an investigation into the facts
and to provide medical treatment shall be
equivalent to such notice; and no defect or
inaccuracy therein shall subject the claimant to
such reduction, if there was no intention to
mislead or prejudice the employer in making his
defense, and the employer was not, in fact, so
misled or prejudiced thereby. If oo notice of the
accident and injury is given to the employer within
one year from the date of the accident, the right to
compensation shall be wholly barred. If no claim
for compensation is filed with the industrial
commission within three years from the date of the
accident or the date of the last payment of
compensation, the right to compensation shall be
wholly barred; provided, however, that the filing
of a report or notice of accident or injury with the
industrial commission, the employer or its
insurance carrier, together with the payment of
any compensatioo benefit or the furnishing of
medical treatment by the employer or an insurance
carrier, tbMh toll the period for Tiling such daim
until the employer or its earner notifies the
industrial commission and employee, in writing, of
its denial of lability or further lability, as the case
may be, for the industrial accident or injury, with
instructions upon said notification of denial to the
employee to contact the industrial commission for
further advice or assistance to preserve or protect
the employee's rights; and provided further, that
the said daim for compensation in any event must
be filed within 8 years from the date of the
accident.
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Exhibit
R490-1-9. Guidelines for Utilization of Medical
Panel.
Pursuant to Section 35-1-77, U.C.A., the Commission adopts the following guidelines in determining
the necessity of submitting a case to a medical panel:
A. A panel will be utilized by the Administrative
Law Judge where:
1. One or more significant medical issues may be
involved. Generally a significant medical issue must
be shown by conflicting medical reports. Significant
medical issues are involved when there are:
(a) Conflicting medical reports of permanent physical impairment which vary more than 5% of the
whole person,
(b) Conflicting medical opinions as to the temporary total cutoff date which vary more than 90 days,
and/or
(c) Medical expenses in controversy amounting to
more than $2,000.
B. A hearing on objections to the panel report may
be scheduled if there is a proffer of conflicting medical
testimony showing a need to clarify the medical panel
report. Where there is a proffer of new written conflicting medical evidence, the Administrative Law
Judge may, in lieu of a hearing, re-submit the new
evidence to the panel for consideration and clarification.
C. The Administrative Law Judge may authorize
an injured worker to be examined by another physician for the purpose of obtaining a further medical
examination or evaluation pertaining to the medical
issues involved, and to obtain a report addressing
these medical issues in all cases where:

"A"

1. The treating physician has failed or refused to
give an impairment rating,
2. The employer or doctor considers the claim to be
non-industrial, and/or
3. A substantial injustice may occur without such
further evaluation.
D. Any expenses of the 6tudy and report of a medical panel or medical consultant and of their appearance at a hearing, as well as any expenses for further
medical examination or evaluation, as directed by the
Administrative Law Judge, shall be paid out of the
Employers' Reinsurance Fund.

